In July my colleague, Matt Braithwaite, announcedthat Chrome and Google would be experimenting with a post-quantum key-agreement primitive in TLS. One should read the original announcementfor details, but we had two goals for this experiment:
Firstly we wanted to direct cryptoanalytic attention at the family of Ring Learning-with-Errors (RLWE) problems. The algorithm that we used, NewHope, is part of this family and appeared to be the most promising when we selected one at the end of 2015.
It's very difficult to know whether we had any impact here, but it's good to see the recent publication and withdrawal of a paperdescribing a quantum attack on a fundamental lattice problem. Although the algorithm contained an error, it still shows that capable people are testing these new foundations.
Our second goal was to measure the feasibility of deploying post-quantum key-agreement in TLS by combining NewHope with an existing key-agreement (X25519). We called the combination CECPQ1.
TLS key agreements have never been so large and we expected a latency impact from the extra network traffic. Also, any incompatibilities with middleboxes can take years to sort out, so it's best to discover them as early as possible.
Here the results are more concrete: we did not find any unexpected impediment to deploying something like NewHope. There were no reported problems caused by enabling it.
Although the median connection latency only increased by a millisecond, the latency for the slowest 5% increased by 20ms and, for the slowest 1%, by 150ms. Since NewHope is computationally inexpensive, we're assuming that this is caused entirely by the increased message sizes. Since connection latencies compound on the web (because subresource discovery is delayed), the data requirement of NewHope is moderately expensive for people on slower connections.
None the less, if the need arose, it would be practical to quickly deploy NewHope in TLS 1.2. (TLS 1.3 makes things a little more complex and we did not test with CECPQ1 with it.)
At this point the experiment is concluded. We do not want to promote CECPQ1 as a de-facto standard and so a future Chrome update will disable CECPQ1 support. It's likely that TLS will want a post-quantum key-agreement in the future but a more multilateral approach is preferable for something intended to be more than an experiment.