技术控

    今日:60| 主题:49409
收藏本版 (1)
最新软件应用技术尽在掌握

[其他] FastPOS Updates in Time for the Retail Sale Season

[复制链接]
頭痛~出賣了我 发表于 2016-10-6 05:04:15
227 7

立即注册CoLaBug.com会员,免费获得投稿人的专业资料,享用更多功能,玩转个人品牌!

您需要 登录 才可以下载或查看,没有帐号?立即注册

x
Mostpoint-of-sale (PoS) threats follow a common process: dump, scrape, store, exfiltrate.FastPOS (initially detected by Trend Micro as TSPY_FASTPOS.SMZTDA) was different with the way it removed a middleman and went straight from stealing credit card data to directly exfiltrating them to its command and control (C&C) servers.
   FastPOS was true to its moniker—pilfer data as fast as possible, as much as it can, even at the expense of stealth. The malware is areflection of how PoS threats, though no longer novel, areincreasingly used against businesses and their customers. As such, FastPOS’s update does not come as a surprise—in time for the oncoming retail season to boot.
   The samples we analyzed were compiled during the second week of September, and feedback from our Smart Protection Network confirmed that they are already deployed against small-medium businesses. FastPOS’s developer also seemed to have wasted no time validating his code by confirming its functionality in a full infection. It only took about a month from when its C&C domain was registered (mid-August) to the launch of its new campaign, making it faster than their previous operation in 2015.
  

  Modular and Architecture-Aware

   We were able to detect FastPOS’s update (TSPY_FASTPOS.A) when we monitored an unusual network connection in one of the endpoints of a company based in North America. The format and keywords, ‘cdosys’ and ‘comdlg64,’ as well as the use of HTTP GET instead of HTTP POST , and the use of a simple HTTP User Agent string (Firefox) for data exfiltration were the initial giveaways.
   
FastPOS Updates in Time for the Retail Sale Season-1 (businesses,different,developer,customers,surprise)

  Figure 1. FastPOS using HTTP GET to exfiltrate data
  FastPOS’s first incarnation was multithreaded, having one process for each functionality—keylogging, RAM scraping, and self-updating. In its latest iteration, the malware makes use of different components hidden in its resource instead of writing everything in one file.
  The components FastPOS’s new version is sporting are:
  
       
  • Serv32.exe – creates and monitors a mailslot and sends its contents to the C&C server   
  • Kl32.exe – keylogger component (32-bit)   
  • Kl64.exe – keylogger component (64-bit)   
  • Proc32.exe – RAM scraper (32-bit)   
  • Proc64.exe – RAM scraper (64-bit)  
   Of note are separate components for 32-bit and 64-bit systems. While both are stored in its resource, only the appropriate component will be copied to the Windows folder and executed. Kl32.exe / Kl64.exe are renamed to kbd.exe , and proc32.exe / proc64.exe to servproc.exe , possibly to make it easier to reference the files without needing to constantly check the affected system’s architecture.
  A Well-Oiled Machine?

   How do the components make the entire system work? The main file extracts all components and passes control to the main service ( serv32.exe ). The main service creates and monitors a central communication medium and directly sends all received information to the C&C server. The keylogger components ( Kl32.exe/Kl64.exe ) hook the keyboard then communicate with the main service to send logged keystrokes to the C&C server. The RAM scraper modules monitor processes and scan for credit card track data, which are then sent to the main service.

FastPOS Updates in Time for the Retail Sale Season-2 (businesses,different,developer,customers,surprise)

  Figure 2. How FastPOS’s components work
   Stolen information is now stowed in mailslots , a mechanism for applications to store and retrieve messages. The use of mailslots to evade AV detection isn’t new. LogPOS (TSPY_POSMAIL.A), which emerged last March 2015 , was one of the first POS malware to utilize this technique. Since mailslots are memory-residing temporary files, it enables attackers to save information about the infected system without leaving traces of a physical file.
  Modules that Steal Together, Stay Together

  The developer’s approach to updating his malware is significant. Modular malware such as FastPOS can be harder to detect as some of the components can be programmed not to work without another. Others such as FastPOS’s do not depend on other components and can be self-executed, but only if the arguments for them are known.
   Uncovering a component doesn’t guarantee others can be found either. For instance, FastPOS’s main service and RAM scraper can be seen running as a service, making them easier to remove. However, the keylogger component can be harder to notice as its code is injected into explorer.exe ’s process memory.
12下一页
友荐云推荐




上一篇:Windows小工具:LnkDown快捷方式加载Payload
下一篇:MultiStateView:Android 通用状态切换视图
酷辣虫提示酷辣虫禁止发表任何与中华人民共和国法律有抵触的内容!所有内容由用户发布,并不代表酷辣虫的观点,酷辣虫无法对用户发布内容真实性提供任何的保证,请自行验证并承担风险与后果。如您有版权、违规等问题,请通过"联系我们"或"违规举报"告知我们处理。

xundoucha 发表于 2016-10-6 17:47:51
路过,我是来打酱油的!
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

qiruitc 发表于 2016-10-7 01:44:43
心里只有你一个频道,最可恨的是还没有广告。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

彭水网友之家 发表于 2016-10-7 03:02:05
楼主呀,,,您太有才了。。。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

wingore 发表于 2016-10-17 13:56:06
你瞧你吧!看背影急煞千军万马,转过头吓退百万雄狮。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

jeanb 发表于 2016-11-13 14:02:43
小弟jeanb默默的路过贵宝地~~~
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

jangjaeho1985 发表于 2016-11-14 13:29:22
小鲜肉心塞
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

晴海 发表于 2016-11-21 17:22:36
楼上是GG还是MM啊?
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

*滑动验证:
您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 立即注册

本版积分规则

我要投稿

推荐阅读

扫码访问 @iTTTTT瑞翔 的微博
回页顶回复上一篇下一篇回列表手机版
手机版/CoLaBug.com ( 粤ICP备05003221号 | 文网文[2010]257号 )|网站地图 酷辣虫

© 2001-2016 Comsenz Inc. Design: Dean. DiscuzFans.

返回顶部 返回列表